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Retrospectives 1971: Regional Challenges

Soviet Economic Reform—
Surprisingly Prescient
Robert E. Hamilton
ABSTRACT: Writing in 1971, economist Dr. John P. Hardt assessed
the trajectory of the Soviet economy arguing the need for reform
and evaluating the willingness of key actors in the Soviet bureaucracy
to support such policies. Fifty years later, Hardt was remarkably
prescient with regard to structural difficulties such reform posed
and the costs of delay. The pervasive role of internal and external
security concerns in the following decades, however, resulted in
economic decisions that defied traditional economic analysis.

P

redicting the future is hard. Predicting the future of a country
Winston Churchill described as “a riddle wrapped in a mystery
inside an enigma” is notoriously difficult.1 Despite the growth
of an entire class of so-called Sovietologists inside Western academic and
policy circles by the late 1980s, few predicted the Soviet Union would
collapse, and none predicted the precise timing and manner of its demise.
Although many observers of the Soviet Union saw the need for reform
by the 1980s, Dr. John P. Hardt was far ahead of the curve. Writing in
Parameters in 1971, Hardt pointed out the need for reform of the Soviet
economy, explained why such reform would be difficult, and concluded
every year it was delayed the cost of these efforts would increase. To be
sure, Hardt did not get everything right, but he got enough right that his
article deserves re-examination for the lessons it still holds 50 years after
its publication.

View from 1971

Hardt begins his article by noting Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev
had announced in 1969 that improved economic performance was a
“first order agenda item for the Party,” setting off a fierce debate between
proponents of a return to a “Stalinist heavy industry-military priority”
and proponents of economic modernization focused on the civilian
economy.2 The problem was falling productivity. Unless productivity
increased, Hardt believed labor shortages would inhibit fulfillment of
the economic goals outlined in the Five-Year Plan for 1971–75. The
solution was obvious: the release of able-bodied males from the armed
forces. Such a policy would alleviate the labor shortages and buy time for
the Soviet economy to modernize and accrue the accompanying gains in

1. Winston Churchill, “The Russian Enigma” (BBC Broadcast, October 1, 1939, transcribed by
The Churchill Society), http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/RusnEnig.html.
2. John P. Hardt, “Brezhnev’s Economic Choice: More Weapons and Control or Economic
Modernization,” Parameters 1, no. 1 (Fall 1971): 43.
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efficiency. While obvious, the solution was a tough sell inside the Soviet
Communist Party due to the “pervasive military influence” there.3
Hardt saw two issues that might shape Soviet economic policy
options moving forward. The first was the familiar “guns versus butter”
debate—the tension between investment in the military and investment
in growth-stimulating consumer goods. Here he thought the power
of the Soviet military-industrial complex would mitigate against the
reallocation of resources toward consumer goods. But Hardt saw another
issue, one that cut across the guns versus butter debate. This issue pitted
the economic professional interested in maximizing efficiency against
the party functionary interested in maximizing control.
Hardt believed the emergence of a de facto alliance of economic
and military professionals might overcome the resistance of party
bureaucrats and allow for economic modernization. Economic and
military professionals would be interested in maximizing both efficiency
and their own ability to make decisions on resource allocation, free from
central party control. As he explained it, “how to formulate economic
plans to implement party policy and how to choose among military
weapons systems to meet requirements of given missions are technical
and professional tasks best performed by the professional institutional
groups rather than the party bureaucrats.”4 In this case, the alliance of
military and economic technocrats might be able to inject rationality and
efficiency into the ideologically hidebound and sclerotic thinking that
dominated Soviet economic planning.
Hardt believed how the guns versus butter and “control versus
efficiency” issues were resolved would frame the economic choices
available to future Soviet planners. He outlined three possible lines of
development for the Soviet Union in the years after 1971. The first line
was a return to the essential features of the Stalinist system of priorities,
control, and administration. Hardt saw such a return as unlikely, mostly
because he thought Stalin’s system could not work without Stalin’s
terror, and Soviet leaders had lost the appetite for unleashing such terror
on their society.
The next path he saw was a continuation of the equivocal, modified
Stalinist system currently in place, in which the economy would still be
focused on military and industrial production, but without the repressive
measures of Stalinism. This outcome would mean “continued strategicmilitary emphasis with institutional stagnation or economic immobilism
[emphasis in original].”5 Hardt saw this path as problematic because it
failed to address the core problem of stagnant economic productivity.
Although he thought the emergence of a new, professionally trained
planning cadre and managerial class might allow for increases in
performance, he noted those increases would be modest without the
3. Hardt, “Brezhnev’s Economic Choice,” 46.
4. Hardt, “Brezhnev’s Economic Choice,” 45.
5. Hardt, “Brezhnev’s Economic Choice,” 51.
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release of resources from the military sector and the delegation of
authority from the party’s center.
Finally, Hardt thought declining economic conditions might force
the hand of party bureaucrats. The third line of development he outlined
envisioned significant changes to the Soviet system. In this case, the
policy-making elite would become more pluralistic and professional, and
management of the economy would become more focused on efficiency
and market stimulation. This transformation would not come about
organically but as a response to an economic crisis.
Economic crisis could force the shift from defense expenditures to growthstimulating ones that would not otherwise be made. In other words, the
shift from defense might be resisted on policy grounds but be taken as
the only viable economic alternative. Economic crisis could likewise
bring about a shift of control to the economic planners and managers in
the quest for recovery.6

Hardt concluded by arguing the longer the Soviet elite delayed
addressing its economic issues, the more difficult these issues would
be to resolve. In perhaps the most prescient sentence of the article, he
concluded “the cost of equivocation is high and rising.” 7

Evaluating Hardt

Hardt was correct on many counts. He understood declining
productivity and the looming labor shortage were serious problems. He
grasped that the pervasive influence of the military over the economy
was going to make reallocation of manpower from the military to the
civilian economy difficult and would complicate the shift from militaryindustrial production to growth-stimulating consumer goods. He also
seemed to perceive that, writing in 1971, he was standing at an inflection
point in history, something difficult to do in the moment.
With the benefit of hindsight, the economist Robert C. Allen says
the Soviet economy grew rapidly from 1928 to around 1970 because it
“accumulated capital and created industrial jobs for people otherwise
inefficiently employed in agriculture.”8 After 1970 the growth rate
dropped abruptly for internal and external reasons—externally the Cold
War diverted resources to the military, cutting the rate of productivity
growth; internally the end of the surplus labor economy choked off
growth. By 1970 “unemployment in agriculture had been eliminated
and the accessible natural resources of the country had been fully
exploited.”9 The fact that Allen, writing in 2001, agreed with the main
conclusions Hardt arrived at 30 years earlier speaks to the prescience of
the latter’s analysis.

6. Hardt, “Brezhnev’s Economic Choice,” 52.
7. Hardt, “Brezhnev’s Economic Choice,” 52.
8. Robert C. Allen, “The Rise and Decline of the Soviet Economy,” Canadian Journal of Economics
34, no. 4 (November 2001): 878.
9. Allen, “Rise and Decline,” 878–79.
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Hardt understood military spending was a drag on Soviet economic
growth, and that the strength of the military in Soviet policy-making
circles would impede the reallocation of resources toward more
productive ends. But he did not think change was impossible, arguing
the emergence of an alliance of military and economic technocrats or an
economic crisis could provide the catalyst for reform. This perspective
turned out to be too optimistic. Had Hardt delved more deeply into
the reasons for the military’s dominance in policy making he would
have been more pessimistic about the ability of the Soviet system to
right itself—the outsized role of the military in Soviet policy making
was itself the effect of the Soviet government’s understanding of the
world and the Soviet Union’s place in it.10 So diverting resources from
security spending to more productive purposes would not just involve
a realignment of policy priorities but a shift in the Soviet government’s
entire worldview.
This worldview saw Soviet security as constantly under threat and
believed superior military force was the only way for the country to
survive. The economist Mark Harrison argues national security
considerations were decisive at every point in Soviet decision making. In
the Bolsheviks’ understanding of the world, they faced dual threats from
an external enemy and an internal enemy, and these enemies colluded
with and reinforced each other. To meet these threats, the economy
was organized to “mobilize against the foreign enemy and suppress the
enemy within.”11
Forced industrialization allowed mass production of military
machinery. Forced collectivization prevented farmers from starving the
towns and the army. And mass killings eliminated “potential enemies,”
those who would “cheer the leaders when it was costless to do so but
would betray them in time of war.”12 Western economists called the
Soviet economy a command economy because it directed efforts to a
few public priorities, imposed rigid quantitative controls on the entire
supply chain, and suppressed private motivation in favor of patriotic
appeals and direct compulsion. But Polish economist Oskar Lange
noted “this was what every society now did in time of war. What called
itself socialism . . . was really a ‘war economy.’ ”13
In an economy on a permanent wartime footing, it is unsurprising
the military played an outsized role in decision making. Historian Chris
Miller gives a revealing account of the military’s role in economic
policy making. Not only could the military claim to be defending the
country from “capitalist aggression,” but it employed some 15 million
people (around 10 percent of the total workforce), conducted 75 percent

10. Mark Harrison, “The Soviet Economy, 1917–1991: Its Life and Afterlife,” Independent Review
22, no. 2 (Fall 2017): 202.
11. Harrison, “Soviet Economy,” 201.
12. Harrison, “Soviet Economy,” 201.
13. Harrison, “Soviet Economy,” 202.
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of the country’s scientific research, and used 60 percent of its steel.14
Even before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985—14 years
after Hardt warned equivocation would raise the cost of addressing the
USSR’s economic problems—the need for reform was urgent and was
obvious to some in the Communist Party. But according to Gorbachev
the power of the military was such “that even a mention of [cutting the
defense budget] would mean immediate dismissal” from the party.15
The military also resisted attempts to make its budget more
transparent. When Gorbachev finally managed to gain a complete view
of Soviet defense spending in 1987, he expressed his frustration that
“military expenditure was not 16 per cent of the state budget, as we had
been told, but rather 40 per cent.”16
But the military was not the only impediment to reform. Miller
details the rise of two additional bureaucratic-economic interest groups
that together with the military-industrial complex had come to dominate
party policy making by the 1980s. These were the agro-industrial
complex and the fuel-energy complex. Inside these three complexes,
economic bureaucrats and industrial interest groups developed
power bases and patronage networks that allowed them essentially to
implement their own policies, sometimes in opposition to those directed
by the Kremlin.17 Officials often spent their entire careers within the
same sector, creating “interconnected webs of relationships, favors,
and loyalty.”18
Like the military, the agricultural and energy sectors argued they
were critical to the state. The agricultural sector noted it employed
millions of citizens and highlighted the Soviet propaganda that
portrayed collectivization as “one of the great successes of socialism.”19
The energy complex proclaimed it provided the bulk of the country’s
export revenue.20 As Miller concludes, Gorbachev’s basic dilemma was
the economic sectors that most needed reform to balance the budget had
the power to prevent that reform.21
The fact Hardt failed to understand the power of the three
bureaucratic-economic interest groups that foiled attempts to reform
the Soviet economy is not surprising for two reasons. First, when Hardt
was writing in 1971 the power of the military-industrial and agroindustrial complexes was already significant, but neither had yet gained
the ability essentially to capture the state budgeting process. The fuelenergy complex only gained prominence after the 1973 oil price spike.

14. Chris Miller, The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse of the
USSR (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 59.
15. Miller, Struggle to Save, 59.
16. Miller, Struggle to Save, 60.
17. Miller, Struggle to Save, 57.
18. Miller, Struggle to Save, 58.
19. Miller, Struggle to Save, 59.
20. Miller, Struggle to Save, 59.
21. Miller, Struggle to Save, 180.
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Figure 1. Soviet Union and Russa Military Spending
Source of data: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1966-1975 (Washington, DC: US Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, Department of State, 1976), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/185668.pdf; and Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” SIPRI (website), https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.
(Map by Pete McPhail)
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Predicting these three groups would together gain enough power to
strangle attempts at reform would have taken a special gift for prophecy.
Next, as an economist Hardt would presumably have expected
the Soviet government to make a value-maximizing decision. He
said as much when he wrote, “the Soviet economy is likely . . . to
find economic performance a factor influencing sharp revisions in
resource allocation—especially from defense to investment—and
a significant increase in the permissive environment for economic
reform.”22 But plenty of research in political science, such as the work
of Graham Allison, Philip Zelikow, and David Houghton, explains
why governments often make non-value-maximizing choices.23 One of
these explanations focuses on the role of government bureaucracies and
their tendency to equate their own interest with the national interest—a
phenomenon clearly visible in Miller’s discussion of the role of the three
bureaucratic-economic interest groups in preventing reform.
Hardt got one final observation right, and it is substantial. He
correctly predicted a return to the Stalinist system of priorities, control,
and administration was unlikely because it would require a return to
Stalin’s tactics of terror, something the Soviet Union was not ready to
relive. In Hardt’s words, “the author does not believe that the Stalinist
terror could be reinstated again, nor that the leaders of a complex, more
modern Soviet state could or would pay the price of depriving their
society of its professionals and thinkers.”24
Miller agrees, observing that the political class, which had suffered
through Stalinism and the Second World War, welcomed Brezhnev’s
policy of stability at the top level of the party as a respite from the fear and
violence of Stalinism. But what neither Hardt nor Brezhnev could have
foreseen was the effect this policy would have on the Soviet economy.
As Miller writes, “in Stalin’s state socialist economy, violence played the
same role that market incentives play in a capitalist economy—a means
of ensuring that workers and managers work hard and effectively.”25
When the threat of violence faded, so did the incentive to meet the
increasingly ambitious economic targets in the Soviet Five-Year Plans.
Soviet economic performance suffered as a result.

Conclusions and Lessons

Any author writing in Parameters today would be gratified to have
his or her work stand the test of time as well as Hardt’s article has. He
saw the need for reform of the Soviet economy before most Western
observers did. He also understood the role of the military would
complicate that reform, and each year of delay would raise the cost
and lower the chances of success in modernizing the Soviet economy.
22. Hardt, “Brezhnev’s Economic Choice,” 45.
23. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd
ed. (New York: Longman, 1999); and David Patrick Houghton, The Decision Point: Six Cases in U.S.
Foreign Policy Decision Making (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012).
24. Hardt, “Brezhnev’s Economic Choice,” 51.
25. Miller, Struggle to Save, 56.
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Perhaps most impressively, he seemed to understand he was writing at
an inflection point: from 1928 until 1970 the Soviet economy had grown
rapidly but began to decline in the 1970s. That decline accelerated in
the 1980s, ending with the economic and political collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991.
Writing in 1971 when many analysts—including Nobel Prize winner
Paul Samuelson—expected the Soviet economy eventually to overtake
that of the United States, Hardt was much less sanguine.26 He correctly
identified the serious structural issues Soviet planners would need to
address and the challenges to doing so.
Hardt did not get everything right. Although he identified the
influence of the military as an impediment to reform, he failed to
understand how strong an impediment it was. He also failed to address
the reason for the military’s outsized influence—the pervasive fear
of external and internal enemies colluding to bring down the Soviet
Union. This fear injected national security considerations into normally
mundane issues like industrial and agricultural policy, seriously
distorting Soviet economic decision making. Finally, as an economist
Hardt would have been trained to expect the Soviet government to
select policy options that maximized economic performance. But time
after time the Kremlin was unwilling or unable to do so until it was too
late. As Hardt had predicted, the cost of equivocation was indeed high.
Modern Russia is not the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, some of
Hardt’s insights are valuable today. Like the Soviet Union of the 1970s,
Russia of 2021 is faced with declining economic performance. After
rising rapidly from 2000–7, Russian GDP per capita flattened due to the
combined impacts of the financial crisis that began in 2008 and Western
sanctions imposed in 2014. In 2019 Russians were essentially no richer in
real terms than they were in 2008: Russian per capita GDP in 2008 was
$11,088, and in 2019 it was $12,012.27
Also like the Soviet Union, Russia’s economic problems are
structural. In the 1970s, the problem was a labor shortage; in 2020 the
problem is Russia’s hydrocarbon-dependent economy, which provides
rents that stifle investment in other sectors and leaves Russia vulnerable
to oil price fluctuations it cannot control. Finally, as it was in the Cold
War, today’s Kremlin is fixated on the idea of collusion between external
and internal enemies. The ceaseless fight against these phantom threats
gives the Russian military and security services outsized roles in Kremlin
budgeting and policy making, leaving fewer resources for addressing
Russia’s real economic and social problems.

26. Ian Harvey, “The Nobel Economist Who Predicted the Soviet Economy Would Overtake
the U.S.,” Vintage News, August 23, 2018, https://www.thevintagenews.com/2018/08/23/soviet
-gnp/, last accessed November 11, 2020.
27. Trading Economics (website), “Russia GDP per capita,” https://tradingeconomics.com
/russia/gdp-per-capita, last accessed November 11, 2020.

